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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 




~. ~L COVEY, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7988 
This appeal arises out of a claim made by respondent 
to a part of the proceeds received by appellant fron1 
the sale of certain drill pipe. 
The trial court awarded respondent a judgrnent in 
the sum of $1788.42, which represented 25.17% of the 
net proceeds received by appellant from the pipe sold. 
From this judg1nent appellant appealed. 
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Appellant's State1nent of Facts does not accurately, 
fairly or completely state the facts which Judge Joseph 
G. Jeppson had before hi1n in considering this ca:-;e. 
For purposes of clarification and conciseness respondent 
will therefore restate the facts which are supported by 
the evidence and upon which the Court made it~ Finding-~ 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree. 
Respondent and appellant were owners of per-
centage interests in the Benjamin Slaugh Oil \Veil Lease 
upon which Baird & Robbins ( 10mpany, drilling opera-
tors, were to drill a well. The leased premi:-;e~ were near 
Vernal, rtah (Exhibit "B"). 
Respondent and appellant are both residents of ~alt 
Lake Cit:,, Utah. 
The well was drilled in the early spring of 19-l-~), tlw 
first pipe for use in the drilling being placed on the :-;itP 
in January of 1949 (Exhibit "5'', R. 38). By .July of 
1949 it became apparent to the percentage holder:-; that 
the well was a dry hole and drilling ceased (R. 1-l-). 
The first drill pipe used in the drilling of the well 
was furnished by the Covey interest, one of whom wa:-; 
S. ~~. Covey. They purchased and delivered to the well 
site 501-+ feet of drill pipe to be used in the drilling of 
the Benjamin Slaugh well. This pipe was secondhand, 
-+% inch drill pipe (R. 28, ~9, Exhibit .. 5"). The pipt-
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furnished by CoYey~ was to remain their property under 
the terms of a certain agree1nent, which is Exhibit "5". 
Paragraph XI C states as follows: 
'"Operator agrees to store said pipe upon the 
pren1ises described in paragraph nun1bered 1 of 
'Descriptions' in a pile identified as the pipe of 
CoYeys and to protect said pipe from injury or 
theft other than acts of God, the public enen1y 
or conditions beyond the control of operator and 
to account to Coveys for said pipe at all times 
and upon request of Coveys to 1nake written 
report of pipe in stock pile and in use by 
operator.'' 
It is apparent frmu the terms of Exhibit "5" that 
the pipe furnished by Coveys was to be used in the 
drilling of nwre than one well, and Baird & Robbins, a 
drilling partnership, was to keep an account of the pipe. 
The 501-! feet of pipe thus furnished was used in the 
drilling of the Slaugh well. During the drilling there 
occurred several twist-offs or breaks in the pipe while 
the first 501-1- feet of pipe was in use (R. 30, 31). No 
accounting for the 501-1 feet of pipe was ever made by 
Baird & Robbins (R. 119, 120). After the 5014 feet of 
pipe had been completely used, Baird & Robbins bor-
rowed from Kerr-:McGee Drilling Company approxi-
mately 600 feet of pipe, which was used to continue with 
the drilling ( R. 32). 
At the tinte the Kerr-McGee pipe was borrowed 
there had been a twist-off and all of the first 5014 feet 
of pipe furnished by Coveys had been used up. When 
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the whipstock, which is a device to drill around the point 
in the well where drill pipe has been lost, was com-
Inenced, the hole was at 4700 feet and the Kerr-:\fcGee 
pipe was put to use (R. 47). It wa~ admitted by appel-
lant that some of his pipe was lost in drilling, the amount 
he was unable to state (R. 118). In April, 1949 respond-
ent, Carlos Johnson, was approached hy Baird & Robbins 
and he agreed to purchase for u~e in the well an addi-
tional 1586 feet of pipe. This pipe was -!~,-:! inch, second-
hand drill pipe. It was identically. the same kind of pipe 
as had been furnished for the drilling by appellant (R. 
36). Respondent purchased the pipe \Yith a cashier's 
eheck from the First Security Bank of :\[agna. The 
check was made directly to Cobb & :--;tringer Drilling 
Cmnpany, from whmn the pipe was purchased (R. -tS). 
Thereafter, respondent was offered an additional inter-
est in the Slaugh well for the pipe. The offer was con-
tained in Exhibit "D". It was signed by Baird & Robhins 
but was not satisfactory to respondent and was never 
accepted by him. Instead he was given a promissory 
note, a eopy of which is marked Exhibit ":2". The promis-
~ory note did not contain all of the agreement between 
Baird & Robbins and respondent. It did recite that the 
pipe purchased by respondent was to remain on the 
Slaugh lease until the prmnissory note was paid. The 
note was never paid nor did respondent sell, trade or 
release the pipe which he had purchased (R. 50). Tt 
was respondent's understanding that he was to retain 
title to and the ownership of the pipe to protect himself 
against loss (R. 72-75, 78, 79). Pnder cross-examination 
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respondent concisely stated his understanding of the 
pipe transaction with Baird: 
.. A. He said he would either buy the pipe 
off of rne or see that I got the pipe back." (R. 75, 
lines 13, 1-t). 
It. was also the understanding of l\1. E. Baird, of Baird 
& Robbins, that the pipe was to rernain the property of 
respondent until paid for (p. 13, 1\I. E. Baird deposition). 
The language of Exhibit ''C" further demonstrates the 
interest of respondent in the pipe in the following 
language: 
·· * * * This rnoney is to be used for the 
purchase of 1586 ft. of drill pipe and to be pur-
chased in Oklahmna City, Oklahmna. It is further 
agreed by Baird and Robbins Drilling Cmnpany, 
Inc., that the said 1586 ft. of drill pipe will remain 
on the Benjarnin Slaugh lease and with the drill-
ing unit, located in Yernal, Utah until the total 
an1otmt of loan is paid in full." 
Neither appellant nor any other person makes any claim 
to the drill pipe bought from Cobb & Stringer by 
respondent for use in the drilling of the well. 
On October 11, 1949, the interest holders 1n the 
Slaugh lease met at the office of Lynn Richards and 
there discussed the status of the lease, possible further 
development of the lease, whether or not the hole which 
had been drilled should be abandoned, and the claims 
of ownership in the Baird & Robbins equipment. Edward 
Casey was appointed secretary of the meeting and made 
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a 1ninute, which is Exhibit "B". The minute recites that 
respondent, the witness l{arren, witness Ruckenbrod, 
lawyer Richard L. Bird, Theron S. Covey, S. G. CoYey, 
the appellant, F. l{. Gilroy and Lynn Richards, were 
present at the meeting. It also recites as follows: 
"The following are claims of ownership m 
the equipment as known by the group: 
Coveys own the drill pipe 
Carlos Johnson drill pipe 




Trucks & Cars held hy Freed Finance Co." 
\Vitness Karren, respondent and appellant's wit-
ness, Ruckenbrod, all recalled the claim hy respondent 
to a part of the drill pipe (R. 39, 52, 92). 
Someti1ne after the meeting of October 11th respond-
ent discussed with Theron Covey the question of the 
drill pipe (R. 52, 53), his first conservation being in 
.January or February of 1950. Respondent recalls that 
the following was the gist of the conservation (R. 53): 
"A. Well, I asked what he was going to do 
about that drill pipe, and he said well, they had 
alread~· taken it down out of the rig and then says 
it run around $1000., and I said, 'Whatever tlw 
expenses are, I want to pay my share.' He said, 
''Vell, we will work something out.' " 
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Thereafter, respondent contacted the Coveys on 
several occasions. At no time did they deny his owner-
ship of the pipe (R. 5-1). However, he was unable to 
obtain an accounting or state1nent concerning what had 
been done with the pipe (R. 55). 
On or about the lOth day of September, 1951 the 
Covey Petroleun1 Corporation sold 5282 feet of drill 
pipe located on the Slaugh lease to the Clark Drilling 
Company and received for said pipe $7,920.37. rrhe 
Clark Drilling Cmnpany renwved from the well site all 
of the drill pipe which was then located at the well 
(Exhibit '"G", R. 111, 112). 
The drill pipe was taken out of the well in 90-foot 
lengths and stacked in the rig at the time the well was 
finished and the drilling stopped, and on October 11, 
1949, the pipe which had been ren1oved was still stacked 
in the rigging at the well site (R. 39). There was no 
accurate count of the pipe made at the time it was 
stacked in the rig. 
The well was drilled to a depth of 5882 feet and it 
would have been necessary to remove from the well 
that amount of pipe at the time the well was abandoned 
(R. 11-1, 115). On March 6, 1950, appellant hired one 
C. :t\1. Chrisley to take the pipe that was standing in the 
rig down and disn1antle it. This necessitated bringing 
onto the well site equipn1ent which would handle the 
90-foot lengths and haul the individual pipes as they 
were separated (R. 134, 135 ). Chrisley took the pipe 
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down out of the rig, dismantled it so that it would be 
reduced from 90-foot lengths to 30-foot lengths and 
stacked the pipe near the rig. No record of the amount 
of pipe dismantled was presented, and as far as could 
be ascertained, was not kept. Chrisley was the agent 
and employee of the appellant and it was Theron S. 
Covey's testimony that without authorization from him 
or anyone else he removed a part of the pipe from the 
well site. The court found that the evidence indicated 
that Chrisley removed some pipe without authority. The 
pile of pipe which Chrisley made was removed by the 
Clark Drilling Company when it purchaf'ed the 5:28:2 feet. 
~Ir. Benjamin Slaugh, the owner of the property on 
which the well was drilled, had been requested by the 
Nheriff of rintah County to watch the drilling machin-
ery and equipment and was hired by appellant to watch 
the drill pipe after it was removed from the drilling 
rig (R. 131, 132). There was only one pile of pipe made 
hy Chrisle:, when the pipe was removed from the rig-
ging (R. 135, 136). None of the pipe was removed from 
the pile after Slaugh was employed to watch it (H. 137), 
except under orders from Theron Covey when the pipe 
was sold to the Clark Drilling Company. The ( 11ark 
Drilling Company removed all of the pipe that was on 
the well site on orders of CovP:' (R. 137, 138). 
A mathematical recapitulation of the pipe situation 
shows the following: 
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Purchased by CoYey8, January, 1949 .... 501-t feef 
Lost by twist-off8 and attrition prior 
to delivery of Johnson pipe ________________ 300 feet 
On ~and at ti1ne of receipt of Johnson 
p1pe ---------------------------------------------------------- -±71-t feet 
Received frmn Johnson ---------------------------- 1586 feet 
Total drill pipe on drill site after 
tT ohnson pipe was delivered ________ 6300 feet 
Proportion owned by Johnson ________________ 1586 feet 
6300 or 
25.17% 
Pipe sold by Theron Covey, October, 
1951 ---------------------------------------------------------- 5282 feet 
Gros~ proceeds fron1 pipe --------------------------$7,920.37 
Co~t of sale and storage ------------------------------ 815.00 
X et proceeds from sale ------------------------$7,105.30 
Respondent's prorata share 
( $7,105.30 X 25.17 7c) ----------------------------$1,788.42 
The Court found on the basis of the evidence pre-
sented that respondent ·was the owner of the 1586 feet 
of pipe purchased fron1 Cobb & Stringer; that said pipe 
became confused with appellant's pipe and that the 
prorata ownership of all of the pipe which was on the 
well site at the tin1e the well was finished was 25.17% 
for respondent and 74.83o/o for appellant. It decreed 
that the $815.00 cost of sale, storage and delivery of 
the confused pipe be divided in accordance with the pro-
rata ownership of the pipe. 
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Appellant cites as the basis for his appeal two 
propositions. First, that the Carlos Johnson pipe did 
not belong to him, and second, that the Court erred in 
refusing to recognize the doctrine of confusion of good~. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED OX 
POIN'T I. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS BEYOND DOUBT THAT 
RESPONDENT WAS THE OWNER OF 1586 FEET OF PIPE 
USED IN THE DRILLING OF THE BENJAMIN SLAUGH 
WELL. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT WERE PROPERLY 
AWARDED PRORATA SHARES OF THE TOTAL CON-
FUSED PIPE SOLD. 
ARGU~iENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS BEYOND DOUBT THAT 
RESPONDENT WAS THE OWNER OF 1586 FEET OF PIPE 
USED IN THE DRILLING OF THE BENJAMIN SLAUGH 
\VELL. 
The evidence presented by all partie:-; coneermng 
ownership of the pipe was not in conflict at any point. 
It was undisputed that 1586 feet of pipe was purchased 
hy a $2500.00 cashier's check which respondent furnished 
to Baird & Robbins. This pipe, it i:-; undisputed, wa:-; 
delivered to the Benjamin Slaugh lease and was there 
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used in the drilling of the well in which respondent and 
appellant were percentage owner~. It is undisputed that 
respondent did not sell, dispose of or pledge the pipe 
which he had furnished and that it was his understanding 
that the pipe wa~ to remain his property. It was the 
understanding of Baird & Hobbins, the drillers, that 
the pipe \Ht::' the property of(_ 1arlos Johnson. 
This i::' not the situation of appellant claiining that 
the Carlos Johnson pipe belonged to hi1n. There is no 
claiin to that pipe n1ade by any person other than 
respondent. Judge Jeppson found that the pipe wa~ 
purchased by Baird & Robbins as the agent of respond-
ent and further found that the title to the pipe at all 
times remained in respondent. The drill pipe was 
exeinpted by the foreclosure proceedings instituted by 
the Sheriff of 1~intah County. 
Respondent repeatedly testified that he was the 
owner of the pipe. Baird testified he assumed that John-
son owned the pipe. In addition we have Johnson mak-
ing claim to the pipe before any dispute ever arose. 
Legal title, a~ 1ne1nbers of the legal profession 
understand that tern1, is a concept which is not clearly 
retained in the Ininds of lay1nen. While they under-
stand the general idea that they are the owners of certain 
propert~', they do not carefully keep separate and apart 
the title concept when the possession of the property and 
ib use is granted to another. There can be no dispute 
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but that respondent was to haYe his money returned 
to hiln or the pipe which he had purchased. ruder the~e 
circumstances title and the security furnished hy the 
pipe were expected b)T all parties to be held and retained 
h.v respondent. 
It seems nearly a univer:-;ally accepted principle 
that a \Vitness llla)' testify as to who i:' the owner of 
personal propert)· where the facts are within his knowl-
edge. Jantzen c. Emanuel German Baptist Church, :27 
Okla. -173, 11:2 Pac. 1127 ~ Ft. ,")IJ!ith & W. R. Co. r. 
Winston, 40 Okla, 173, 136 Pac. 107;); ~'-J'Jmrks r. Galena 
Nat. Bank, 68 l{an. 148, 7-1 Pac. 619; illeudocino Couuty 
v. Barnard, 57 Cal. App. :2d +50, 1:3+ P. :2d Sl+. 
Title and ownership, a~ i~ pointed out in the cited 
<·a~P~, \\·here personal property is involved i~ ordinarii~· 
a simple fact clearly within the knowledge of the owner 
or witness. 
It would have been unju~t enrichment for the trial 
court to decree that appellant, who doe~ not own the 
pipe, should be given the proceeds from it. Ht>~pondent 
purchased the pi~pe and he has never transferred or 
relinquished it to anyone else. The title and ownership 
of the pipe, as the trial court found, wa~ hi~. 
It is submitted that under the evidence, the law and 
equities applicable in this case that respondent is the 
owner and entitled to all the henefi t~ of ownership in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Benjamin ~laugh lease and a portion of which was sold 
hy appellant. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDEXT AND APPELLANT WERE PROPERLY 
AWARDED PRORATA SHARES OF THE TOTAL CON-
Fl.SED PIPE SOLD. 
mg: 
Appellant state~ a~ Point :2 of his Brief the follow-
"The l'ourt erred in refusing to recognize the 
doctrine of confusion of goods." 
Respondent i~ mnazed at this statement since it appears 
from a cursory examination of the law that the Court 
applied the doctrine of confusion of goods. Perhaps 
what i~ meant hy Point :2 of appellant's brief is that the 
Court did not forfeit the interest of respondent in the 
confused goods. The doctrine which appellant seeks 
to apply being the one which is applied where the con-
fusion is fraudulent. There the fraudulent confuser 
loses all of his interest in the confused goods because 
of his attempted fraud. 
The rule is without dissent that where the confusion 
1s non-tortious but results frmn an innocent or negli-
gent intermingling of goods which cannot be separated 
and are of unifonn quality, no one forfeits his interest, 
hut the owners are tenants in common. The~· share the 
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losses prorata and are entitled to their prorata ~hare 
of the confused goods. This has always been the law 
of the State of Utah. It wa:s first announced in j[anti 
City Savings Bank r. Peterson et al., 33 ITtah 209, :2:.W. 
93 Pae. 566. In the Petersou case the confusion occurred 
when one Thomp~on leased sheep from a number of per-
sons and then gave a chattel mortgage to the ~lanti City 
Savings Bank on 1600 head of sheep. Part of the slwep 
mortgaged were those in which Thomp~on's only intere~t 
was that of a lessee. r:rhompson then died and the hank 
attmnpted to foreclose it:.- chattel mortgage on all of the 
sheep in the Thompson herd. The sheep were ~imilarl~­
marked with Thompson's earmark and branded with 
his wool brand. It wa:-; a simple easP of confusion of 
chattels. The nuious lessors and the mortp;ageP WPre 
unable to seg-regate and :-;eparate their particular prop-
erty. The Supreme Court of rtah clearly and succinctly 
sets forth the law applicable from whieh there i:-; no 
dissent in the decided ea~e~: 
" * * * If the sheep which the defendant~ 
had leased werP mixed with the shPPJ> of the 
deceased so as to be incapable of identification, 
the deceased and the defendant:.;, a:-; to tlw herd, 
became tenants in common. \Ylmtever intPrP~t 
the deceased as such tenant in common had in and 
to the herd the plaintiff succeeded to under it:-; 
mortgage. Generally o1w tenant in cmmtwn ean-
not maintain replevin again:-;t his co-tenant for 
hi~ individual interest in the common property. 
Such undoubtedly i~ the rule where tlw eoBllllOil 
propel't~· consists of a :-;pp(·ifie ('hattel or a :-;ing]P 
pieee of pro pert~·. a:-; wa:-; the <·a:-;p in Hill r. 
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Sca_<Jcr, 3 Ctah 379, 3 Par. 5-15, or where the 
things in their nature are so far indivisible that 
the share of one is not susceptible of delivery 
without the whole. But it has been frequently 
held that the rule should not obtain in a case 
where the intermingled property is alike in qual-
ity and value and readily divisible by measure-
Inent or "-eig·ht. It has been quite generally held 
that tenants in rommon, or persons who are 
~epara te owners of articles stored in rnass, such 
as corn, wheat, coal, logs, etc., each article being 
of like nature and quality with the others, may 
haYe replevin for his proportionate part of the 
intermixed chattels if the same is wrongfully 
detained and the action is necessary for the main-
tenance of his rights, subject to deductions for 
any loss or waste properly falling to his share 
u-lzile the property remained in mass. (20 Am. & 
Eng. Eney. Law, 493, and cases; Shinn on 
Replevin, sec. 183, and cases.) 
"If the testimony of the defendants is true, 
and the sheep were intermingled and incapable of 
identification, they and the plaintiff at the tirne 
of its demand were tenants in common, but before 
it was entitled to maintain the action it was neces-
sary to show that the property was alike in 
quality and value; was easily divisible; that the 
defendants asserted ownership to the entire herd, 
or attempted to remove or convert the common 
property, or otherwise wrongfully held it antago-
nistic and hostile to the rights of the plaintiff, 
that they refused, on plaintiff's demand, to 
deliver; and that the action was necessary for 
the maintenance of plaintiff's rights. When such 
is shown it is entitled to the possession of what-
ever interest the deceased, as tenant in common, 
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had in and to the herd at the tilne of his death. 
It is entitled to no nwre. It in no event wa~ 
entitled to the possession of the interests which 
the defendants, or either of them, had in and to 
the herd." 
Respondent has Shepardized the Peterson case and 
the case is good law and applicable to the facts before 
this Court. The prorata share of the loss or waste must 
be borne by the parties in accordance with their per-
~entage shares while the goods are in the confused mas:-:. 
In the case at bar the mathematics applied b~· the 
Court indicated that it found that prior to the delin-'ry 
of the pipe belonging to respondent, the 501-! feet of 
pipe which was owned by appellant had been reduced by 
approximately 300 feet. 'Jlhis reduction in the numher 
of feet was caused by a number of depleting incidents. 
First, prior to the delivery of the Johnson pipe there 
had been three twist-offs, the first at around 1800 feet, 
the second at around 4900 feet, and the third at approxi-
Inatel~· 5200 feet (R. 45, -!G). In addition to the twist-
offs there were three or four lengths of the pipe deliv-
ered by Coveys which were so worn or defedivP as to 
1nake the1n unmmble in the drilling of the well (H. 4--1-). 
vVhen the well had reached the 4700-foot h_,vel it wa~ 
necessary to use borrowed pipe to conunen<'e drilling-
again. At that time 600 feet of pipe wa:-: borrowed from 
J(err-I\fcGee and used when the 4700-foot level drilling 
was commenced. This fact would indicate hp:·ond douht 
that at that point there had been depleted from the pipe 
furnished hy Coveys a minimum of 300 feet of pipP. 
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The GOO feet of 1\::err-.JleUee p1pe was used and 
returned, it being marked specifically so that the smne 
pipe borrowed could be returned. 
It wa~ only after the twist-off~ and the losses 
enumerated that respondent'~ 15~() feet of pipe was 
placed on the well ~ite and u~ed in the drilling operations. 
It thus appear::;; that in the confused pipe appellant 
owned approxi1nately 471-! feet and respondent owned 
l:lSii feet. These figure~ are tho~e used by the Court 
in arriving at the proportionate losses to be sustained 
by the parties. \Yhen applied the~· give us the percentage 
of :2:l.17% as the prorata share of respondent, both as to 
lo:-;~e:-; to be borne and as to ownership in the pipe 
remaining after all losses have been deducted. 
The Court in applying the percentage of losses to 
be borne by the parties followed what seen1s to be the 
only equitable and proper rule. The aliquote part rule 
as applied to confused driH pipe is set forth in the case 
of Dalton r. Bilbo, 126 Okla. 139, 258 Pac. 274, 276, one 
of the cases cited hy appellant, in \vhich the following 
language is set forth: 
" * * * But other factors, which defendant 
centends would render identification possible 
( 'smue of the joints were short and some long;' 
·~on1e were threaded one way and some another;' 
'smne was rotten and some was good'), were not 
peculiar to plaintiff's casing. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that the secondhand cas-
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ing of the defendant, with which the casing in con-
troversy had been mingled, did not posses~ some 
or all of the above characteristics. 
"Cob by in his work on Replevin ( 2d Ed.) p. 
206, says: 
'' • But where the goods are mixed and 
are of the same nature and value, although 
not capable of an actual separation by identi-
fying each particle, yet if a division can he 
made of equal value, as in the case of oat:-:, 
corn, or wheat, each part)· may claim hi~ ali-
quot part.' 
"We believe, therefore, that the casing in 
controversy did not have such distinguishing 
characteristics as to take it out of the rule relating 
to confusion of goods with other goods of like 
character, and that the instruction wa~ properly 
given." 
The rule requiring forfeiture h~· a party who~l' 
goods have been intermingled and confused with another 
has been clearly and succinctly di~(·u~~Pd in tlw fairl~· 
recent New :Mexico ca~e of Page r. Jo1u's et a/., 2(i K. "jl. 
195, 190 Pac. 541, 5-!:2. There the ('OUrt in pointing out 
the occasions when the forfeiture rule ~hould he applied 
and distinguishing situation~ such as exi:-:t in the prP:-:Pnt 
case, stated as follows: 
"The rule is that where one fraudulPntl~·. 
willfully, or wrongfully intermingle~ his good:-: 
with those of another, so that there is no evidence 
to distinguish the goods of the one from tho~e of' 
the other, the party responsible for the ('Onfu~ion 
forfeit:-: all his interest in thP mixture to tht- other 
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party. and in the case of agents, bailees, execu-
tor~. administrators, and other trustees, occupy-
ing positions of trust and confidence, the rule as 
to the confusion applies when the mixing is 
merely negligent or careless. But these harsh 
rules are not generally applied where the con-
fused goods, though indistinguishable, are of 
equal and nnifonn value; that is, when the mix-
ture i~ approxinmtely honwgeneous. In such a 
ea~e a~ this, the remedy i~ division in kind, or 
cmnpensation for actual loss. Take, for exmnple, 
the case of an administrator. Suppose he has in 
his hands 100 bushels of wheat be'longing to the 
estate and 100 bushels of his own. The wheat 
being the same quality, it is dumped into the same 
bin. There is no doubt a~ to the exact amount 
contributed. It would be absurd to say that the 
adn1ini:'trator should lose the hundred bushels 
which he put in because of his negligence. Of 
course, if the wheat was of different grade, a dif~ 
ferent rule would be applied, for the mixture 
would not be ali of the same quality. For an 
exhaustive discussion of the subject, see the case 
of Claffin & Co. v. Con. J er:-;ey \Vorks, 85 Ga. 27, 
11 N. E. 7:21. See, also, note to the case of A)Te 
v. Hixson, Ann. Ca~. 1913E, 671. In the case of 
Hesseltine. v. Stockwell, 30 Me. 237, 50 Am. Dec. 
<i:27, the court said : 
"'The cormnon law in opposition to the 
civil law assigns the whole property, with-
out liability to account for any part of it, to 
the innocent party, when there has been a 
confusion of goods, except in certain cases, 
or conditions of property. ChanceUor Kent 
corrertly observes that the rule is carried 
no further than nEcessity requires. 2 Kent's 
('om. 365. 
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" 'There is therefore no forfeiture of 
the goods of one who voluntarily and with-
out fraud makes such an aillnixture. A~ 
when, for example, he supposes all the goods 
to be his own, or when he does it by mistake. 
"'And there is no forfeiture in case of 
a fraudulent intermixture when the good~ 
intermixed are of equal value. This ha::-; not 
been sufficiently noticed, and yet it is a ju:-:t 
rule, and is fuHy sustained by authorit~·. 
Lord Eldon, in the case of Lupton v. 'Yhi te, 
15 Ves. -!42, states the law of the old decided 
cases to be, 'If one man mixes his corn or 
flour with that of another and they were of 
equal value, the latter must have the given 
quantity; but if articles of a different value 
are mixed, producing a third. value, the 
aggregate of the whole, and through the 
fault of the person mixing them, the other 
party cannot tell what wa::-; the original value 
of his property; he must have the whole.' 
11his doctrine is stated with approbation by 
l(ent. 2 Kent's Com. 365.' 
''In thi::-; ca::-;e so far as appears from the Pvi-
dence the sheep in question prior to the inter-
mixing of the herd were all of the same kind, 
character, and quality, so that when eonfu::-;ed, the 
1nixture was approximately homogenou~. 'rhe 
parties know definitely the number of sheep con-
tributed by each to the cmnmon mas~, and tlw 
loss to the common herd in justice and equity 
should be shared by the parties in proportion to 
their interests in the commingled goods. The 
rule announced in the case of Gonzale~ v. IlfPid, 
supra, practically disposes of thi~ case. "'"p there 
said: 
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·· · \ V e agree with the trial court in its 
finding that it was through the fault and 
negligence of the appellant that the sheep in 
question were so marked and commingled 
as to render their identification impossible. 
His acts led to the confusion of the goods, 
but it is urged upon us that appellant's acts, 
althoug·h negligent, were in no sense fraudu-
lent or wrongful, and that he should not be 
1nade to forfeit his property when the ele-
ments of willful, fraudulent, and wrongful 
connningling of the property are absent. We 
think this position well taken. * * * 
.. · \Ve therefore hold that the court 
should have pennitted appellant to recover 
his proportionate share of the sheep n1arked 
with appellee's earn1ark, as there was no 
willful wrong nor fraud imputed to the appel-
lant shown by the evidence nor found by the 
court in its findings.· 
"If it be true, as testified to by Giddings, 
that the earmark in which he was required by the 
contract to carry the Page sheep belonged to 
him, there might not even be the element of negli-
gence in the case. \V e think, however, that under 
the undisputed facts in the ca~e the appellee was 
only entitled to her proportionate part of the con-
fused property." 
X o equitable principle requires the court to give to 
appellant any preference in the prorata share of the 
goods to which he is entitled by reason of the fact that 
he wa~ first on the scene and seized the goods. Respond-
ent wa~ entitled to rely on the statements of Theron 
('on=-~· that an arrangement concerning the cost of 
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storage and sale of the confused pipe could be worked 
out. It is also the law that prior seizure or replevin of 
confused goods does not entitle the prior replevisor to 
a priority as to his aliquote share. A case applying- thi~ 
principle is Ramsey v. Rodenburg, et al., 72 Colo. 567, 
212 Pac. 820, 821. There was an insufficient amount of 
confused wheat to restore the owners to their original 
shares. The Court points out that regardlt>ss of the 
sequence of action hy the owners they are onl~· entitled 
to their prorata share of the whole, and any loss must 
be borne equally according to the percentages owned in 
the connnon mass. It ~ets forth this principle in tlw 
following language: 
"It i~ conceded that, where goods are mixed 
in a counnon mass by several owners, and are of 
the same nature and quality, although not capa-
ble of separation b~· identification of each parti-
cle, yet, if a division can be made, as in case of 
wheat, then each owner may claim his aliquote 
part of the common mass and enforce his right 
in an action of replevin. Wells on Replevin, ~P<'. 
205; Cob bey on Replevin, ~Pe. 408; Kaufmann Y. 
Schilling, 58 :\lo. 218; Gri111Ps Y. Cannell, ~:~ X eh. 
187, 36 N. W. -!79. 
"Counsel contends, however, that, the plain-
tiff having first levied his writ, and having taken 
possession of the wheat, a segregation as a mattPr 
of fact had already taken place by such proceed-
ing, and that a prorating in such circumstanees 
could not be had. It does not so appear to us. 
Plaintiff intermixed ~-!9 bushels of his wheat with 
2,101 lmslwls helongi11g· to intervener, and tlwn 
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levied on 1,088 bushels. Intervener took the 
ren1aining -!09 bushels of wheat, and then inter-
Yened in plaintiff's suit and denied his right to 
the possession of 1,088 bushels, charging, in 
effect, that the plaintiff was entitled to but 427.77 
bushels, and that the intervener was entitled to 
1,069.23 bushels. \Yhen the plaintiff attempted 
to take wheat beyond his proportionate share, it 
wa~ an attempt by him to take wheat which did 
not belong to hi1n, but which did belong to the 
intervener, and this question of fact, as to the 
ratio the anwunt of wheat deposited in the eleva-
tor by the intervener bore to the whole mass, was 
determinable in the replevin suit. 
"It i~ well settled by authority that, where 
grain of different owners has been intermixed in 
connnon mass by an elevator or warehouse, with-
out objection, it becomes common property, owned 
by the several parties in the proportion in which 
each contributed to the common mass, and the 
owners n1ust sustain any loss pro rata which may 
occur by diminution, decay, or otherwise. Brown 
v. Northcutt, 14 Or. 529, 13 Pac. 485; Young v. 
~Iiles, 20 \Vis. 623; Drudge v. Leiter, 18 Ind. App. 
694, 49 X. E. 37, 63 Am. St. Rep. 359; Dole v. 
Olmstead, 36 Ill. 150, 85 A1n. Dec. 397; Sexton 
Y. Grahmn, 53 Iowa, 181, -! N. W. 1090; Piazzek 
v. \Vhite, 23 Kan. 621, 33 Am. Rep. 211; 30 Am. 
& Eng. Ency. -t-1; 40 Cyc. 407.'' 
These eases, as will be noted, follow without dissent 
or distinction the law which was declared by Barnk v. 
Peterson, supra, as the law of the State of Utah. 
For further application of the confusion of goods 
dortrine see Great ~~·outh~rn Gas & Oil Co. v. Logan 
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Natural Gas & F'ltel Co., 155 Fed. 11-t; ~:3 CCA 57-! 
( cert. den. 28 S. Ct. 256, 207 U. S. 590, 52 L. Ed. 35-!), 
where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the 
confusion of goods doctrine to natural gas and allowed 
the plaintiff to recover a prorata share of the gas which 
was distributed through defendant's pipe line. Allowing-
one-sixtieth of the total amount of ga~ so distributed 
where plaintiff's gas ,,·a~ mixed with the gas of sixt~· 
other gas wells. 
It thus appears that the Court has correctly applied 
the law applicable to confusion of goods. \Ye submit 
it properly refused to order that respondent forfeit any 
of his interests or suffer any greater loss than hi~ pro-
rata share of the diminution in amount of pipe which 
occurred after the pipe which he owned became confused 
with the pipe which was owned by the appellant ( 'oyey. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that Hi~ llonor, 
Judge Joseph G. Jeppson, has con·ectl~· found in accord-
ance with the evidence presented. Has applied the law 
applicable to confu~ion of goods situationi" and fairly 
and equitably, in accordance with the law:-~ of the ~tate 
of rtah, apportioned the depletion of the pipe between 
the parties in accordance with their prorata owner~hip. 
The decree fairly distributes to the partie:-~ their pro-
rata and aliquote portion of the confused goods remain-
ing after the lo~:::es have been distributed. 
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It is, therefore, respectfully 8Ubmitted that this 
Court should affinn the judg1nent of the trial court. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
RA \VLINGS, \VALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACI{, 
D\YIGHT L. KING 
Co ll usel for Respondent. 
530 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
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